חAmIBIA UחIVERSITY OF SCIEחCE AПD TECHחOLOGY

## FACULTY OF COMPUTING AND INFORMATICS

DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE

| QUALIFICATION: BACHELOR OF COMPUTER SCIENCE |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| QUALIFICATION CODE: O7BACS | LEVEL: 7 |
| COURSE: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE | COURSE CODE: ARI711S |
| DATE: JUNE 2022 | PAPER: THEORY |
| DURATION: 3 HOURS | MARKS: 93 |


| FIRST OPPORTUNITY EXAMINATION QUESTION PAPER |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| EXAMINER(S) | Prof. JOSE QUENUM |
| MODERATOR: | Mr STANTIN SIEBRITZ |
|  |  |

## INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer ALL the questions.
2. Read all the questions carefully before answering.
3. Number the answers clearly

Question 1
(a) Consider the blocks world. The blocks can be on a table or in a box. Consider three generic actions: $a_{0}, a_{1}$, and $a_{2}$ described as follows:
$a_{0}$ : when applied to a block, will keep it in the box;
$a_{1}$ : when applied to a block, will move it on the table;
$a_{2}$ : when applied to two blocks, will move the first one on top of the second one.
Consider the following four states in the system:
$\mathrm{S}_{0}$ : all blocks are in the box, no block is on the table;
$S_{1}$ : only block $B$ is on the table; all other blocks are in the box;
$S_{2}$ : both blocks $B$ and $C$ are on the table, with $C$ on top of $B$;
$S_{3}$ : blocks $B, C$ and $D$ are on the table, with $D$ on top of $C$ and $C$ on top of $B$.
Furthermore, additional information is provided in Table 1, where each state has a reward, possible actions and a transition model for each action. Note that for a given action, the probability values indicated in its transition model all sum up to 1 .

Table 1: Additional information

| State | Reward | Action | Transition Model |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathrm{S}_{0}$ | ro | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{ob}} \\ & \mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{b}} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \left(1, \mathrm{~S}_{0}\right) \\ \left(\mathrm{p}_{0}, \mathrm{~S}_{0}\right) ;\left(\mathrm{p}_{1}, \mathrm{~S}_{1}\right) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\mathrm{S}_{1}$ | $\mathrm{r}_{1}$ | $\begin{aligned} & a_{0 c} \\ & a_{1 c} \\ & a_{2 c} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \left(1, \mathrm{~S}_{1}\right) \\ \left(\mathrm{p}_{0}^{1}, \mathrm{~S}_{1}\right) ;\left(\mathrm{p}_{1}^{1}, \mathrm{~S}_{4}\right) ;\left(\mathrm{p}_{2}^{1}, \mathrm{~S}_{2}\right) \\ \left(\mathrm{p}_{0}^{2}, \mathrm{~S}_{1}\right) ;\left(\mathrm{p}_{1}^{2}, \mathrm{~S}_{2}\right) ; \end{gathered}$ |
| $\mathrm{S}_{2}$ | $\mathrm{r}_{2}$ | $\begin{aligned} & a_{0 d} \\ & a_{1 d} \\ & a_{2 d} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \left(1, \mathrm{~S}_{2}\right) \\ \left(\mathrm{p}_{0}^{3}, \mathrm{~S}_{2}\right) ;\left(\mathrm{p}_{1}^{3}, \mathrm{~S}_{5}\right) ;\left(\mathrm{p}_{2}^{3}, \mathrm{~S}_{3}\right) \\ \left(\mathrm{p}_{0}^{4}, \mathrm{~S}_{2}\right) ;\left(\mathrm{p}_{1}^{4}, \mathrm{~S}_{3}\right) ; \end{gathered}$ |
| $\mathrm{S}_{3}$ | 100 | - | - |

Assuming we model this problem as Markov Decision Process ( $\mathcal{M D P}$ ) and consider a discount value $\sigma$, provide the utility of each of the states $\mathrm{S}_{0}, \mathrm{~S}_{1}$ and $\mathrm{S}_{2}$ for the first three iterations using the value iteration algorithm. Note that although the states $\mathrm{S}_{4}$ and $\mathrm{S}_{5}$ have not been defined, they should be assumed in the system.
(b) Consider the following policy, $\pi_{0}=\left\{\mathrm{S}_{0} \mapsto \mathrm{a}_{0 \mathrm{~b}}, \mathrm{~S}_{1} \mapsto \mathrm{a}_{1 \mathrm{c}}, \mathrm{S}_{2} \mapsto \mathrm{a}_{2 \mathrm{~d}}\right\}$. Is $\pi_{0}$ optimal? Explain.

## Question 2

[15 points]
The diagram in Figure 1 represents the extensive form of a sequential game

1. Provide the strategic form associated with the game;
2. Does any player have a dominant strategy?
3. Is there a dominant strategy equilibrium?


Figure 1: Sequential Game
4. What are the Nash equilibria?

Question 3
[15 points]
(a) Consider a game $\mathcal{G}$ whose strategic form is represented as follows:

Player2

|  |  | $\imath_{1}$ | $\jmath_{1}$ | $\ell_{1}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Player1 | $\imath_{0}$ | $(7,2)$ | $(2,5)$ | $(6,3)$ |
|  | $\jmath_{0}$ | $(2,2)$ | $(6,5)$ | $(4,8)$ |
|  | $\ell_{0}$ | $(3,1)$ | $(2,7)$ | $(4,9)$ |

Is there a dominated strategy for Player 2? If yes eliminate it;
(b) The resulting game is now called $\mathcal{G}^{\prime}$. Is $\ell_{0}$ a worse strategy for Player 1 than playing a mixed strategy of $\tau_{0}$ and $\jmath_{0}$ in $\mathcal{G}^{\prime}$ ?
(c) what is the payoff of each player when they play a mixed strategy with Player 1 eliminat-
ing $\ell_{0}$ in $\mathcal{G}^{\prime}$ ?

## Question 4

$\qquad$ [20 points]
Consider the blocks world. Here we have seven (7) blocks: A, B, C, D, E, F and G. There is also a table with a capacity of three (3) blocks (i.e., three distinct blocks can lay on the table at any point in time simultaneously). It is assumed that a block can either be inside the box or outside. When outside the box, a block can either be on the table or on top of another block.

We have the following predicates:
ontable ( x ) : the block x is on the table;
on $(\mathrm{x}, \mathrm{y})$ : the block x lays on top of the block y ;
$\operatorname{clear}(\mathrm{x})$ : the block x is clear, i.e., there is nothing on top of it;
inbox $(\mathrm{x})$ : the block x is inside the box.
Moreover, the following actions are introduced:
pick( x ) : which picks a block from the box and drops it on the table;
$d r o p(\mathrm{x}, \mathrm{y}):$ which drops the block on either the table or another block.
Consider a partial plan $Q$ containing two actions: $\mathrm{a}_{0}$ and $\mathrm{a}_{2}$, with $\mathrm{a}_{0} \prec \mathrm{a}_{2}$. The action $\mathrm{a}_{0}$ has the following effect:
ontable (B); ontable (C); ontable (E); clear (B); clear (C); clear (E);inbox (D);inbox (F);inbox (G);

The action $\mathrm{a}_{2}$ leads to a goal state and has the following pre conditions:

$$
\text { ontable (F); ontable }(\mathrm{A}) ; \text { clear (Table }) \text {; on }(\mathrm{B}, \mathrm{~A}) \text {; on }(\mathrm{C}, \mathrm{~B}) ; \text { on }(\mathrm{D}, \mathrm{C}) ; \text { on }(\mathrm{E}, \mathrm{~F}) \text {; }
$$

Modify Q to generate a complete and correct plan.

